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Abstract
In the classical framework of local distributed network computing, it is generally assumed
that the entities executing distributed algorithms are altruistic. However, in various scenarios,
the value of the output produced by an entity may have a tremendous impact on its future.
This is for instance the case of tasks such as computing maximal independent sets (MIS) in
networks. Indeed, a node belonging to the MIS may be later asked more than to a node not
in the MIS — e.g., because MIS in networks are often used as backbones to collect, transfer,
and broadcast information, which is costly. In this paper, we revisit typical local distributed
network computing tasks in the framework of algorithmic game theory. Specifically, we focus
on the construction of solutions for locally checkable labeling (LCL) tasks, which form a large
class of distributed tasks, including MIS, coloring, maximal matching, etc., and which have been
studied for more than 20 years in distributed computing.
Given an LCL task, the nodes are collectively aiming at computing a solution, but, at the
individual level, every node plays rationally and selfishly with the objective of optimizing its
own profit. Surprisingly, the classical frameworks for game theory are not fully appropriate
for the purpose of our study. Moreover, we show that classical notions like Nash equilibria
may yield algorithms requiring an arbitrarily large number of rounds to converge. Nevertheless,
by extending and generalizing core results from game theory, we establish the existence of a
so-called trembling-hand perfect equilibria, a subset of Nash equilibria that is well suited to
LCL construction tasks. The main outcome of the paper is therefore that, for essentially all
distributed tasks whose solutions are locally checkable, there exist construction algorithms which
are robust to selfishness, i.e., which are guaranteeing that nodes have no incentive to deviate
from the actions instructed by these algorithms.
∗All authors received supports from the ANR project DISPLEXITY, and from the INRIA project GANG.
†Funded by the European Research Council (ERC) under the H2020 research and innovation program (grant No
648032).
ar
X
iv
:1
60
7.
03
67
7v
1 
 [c
s.D
C]
  1
3 J
ul 
20
16
1 Introduction
1.1 Context and Objective
In the conceptual framework of local distributed computing in networks [27], algorithms solving
tasks such as minimum-weight spanning tree, maximum matching, coloring, maximal independent
set, etc., usually assume that every node of the network will obey their instructions. This might be
appropriate in a context in which each node is altruistic and/or oblivious to its output. However,
there exist several settings in which the future of a node depends on its output. For instance,
independent sets and dominating sets can be used as backbones to collect, transfer, and broadcast
information, and/or as cluster heads in clustering protocols [16, 20]. Hence, belonging to the
independent set or to the dominating set may generate future costs in term of energy consumption,
computational efforts, and bandwidth usage. As a consequence, rational selfish nodes might be
tempted to deviate from the instructions of the algorithm, so that to avoid becoming member of
the independent set or dominating set under construction. On the other hand, the absence of a
backbone or of cluster heads may penalize the nodes. Hence every node is subject to a tension
between (1) facilitating the construction of a solution, and (2) avoiding certain types of solutions.
The objective of this paper is to design algorithms enabling to resolve this tension.
For example, a large class of randomized maximal independent set (MIS) algorithms [1, 19]
proceed in rounds, where a round allows every node to exchange information with its neighbors in
the network. Roughly, at each round, every node i which has not yet decided proposes to enter
the MIS with a certain probability pi. If a node proposes itself to enter the MIS, and none of
its neighbors is also proposing itself to enter the MIS, then it enters the MIS. If two adjacent
nodes simultaneously propose themselves to enter the MIS, then there is a conflict, and both nodes
remain undecided. The quality of the algorithm heavily depends on the choice of the probability pi
that node i proposes itself to enter the MIS, which may typically depend on the degree of node i,
and may vary along with the execution of the algorithm as node i accumulates more and more
information about its neighborhood. Hence, a node i aiming at avoiding entering the MIS might
be tempted to deviate from the algorithm by setting pi small. However, if all nodes deviate in this
way, then the algorithm may take a very long time before converging to a solution.
Coloring is another example where nodes may adopt selfish strategies to avoid some specific
solutions. This is for instance the case where coloring is viewed as an abstraction of frequency
assignment in radio networks. Some frequencies might be preferred to others because, e.g., some
frequencies might be conflicting with local devices present at the node. As a consequence, not all
colors are equal for the nodes, and while each node is aiming at constructing a coloring quickly (in
order to take benefit from the resulting radio network), it is also aiming at avoiding being assigned
a color that does not please it. Now, similarly to MIS construction, a large class of randomized
coloring algorithms proceed in rounds, roughly as follows (see, e.g., [3]). At each round, every
node that has not yet decided a color (1) picks a color uniformly at random among the available
colors (i.e., among a given palette, but the colors already decided by neighboring nodes), (2) checks
whether this color is conflicting with the random colors picked by the neighbors, and (3) decides
this color in absence of conflicts. If a node has preferences to some colors, then it might be tempted
to give more weight to its preferred colors in its random choices. Again, if all nodes deviate this
way, then the algorithm may take a long time before converging to a solution, if converging at all.
In this paper, we address the issue of designing distributed algorithms that are robust to selfish
behaviors of the nodes. Obviously, algorithmic game theory has been conceived especially for
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tackling such issues. So, more precisely, we are aiming at answering the following question:
Existence of algorithms coping with non-cooperative behavior: Do there exist some forms
of equilibria in the games formalizing distributed tasks such as the one sketched above? That is,
do there exist strategies, i.e., probability distributions over the random choices to be made by
each node at each round, from which no rational selfish players have incentive to deviate? More
importantly, if such equilibria exist, are they corresponding to efficient algorithms for solving the
tasks?
1.2 Our Results
First, we define LCL games, induced by a generic form of randomized algorithms for constructing
solutions to locally checkable labeling (LCL) tasks (cf. Section 2). Recall that locally checkable
labeling tasks [21] form a large class of classical problems, including maximal independent set,
coloring, maximal matching, minimal dominating set, etc., studied for more than 20 years in the
framework of distributed computing.
Next, we observe that classical frameworks for algorithmic game theory do not fully capture
the essence of distributed games (cf. Section 3). Moreover, we show that the classical notion of
Nash equilibria is not sufficient to characterize desirable distributed algorithms, i.e., efficient and
robust to the selfish behaviors of the nodes. In particular, we show that there are Nash equilibria
which correspond to algorithms whose running times, i.e., number of rounds, are arbitrarily large
(cf. Proposition 1).
In contrast, we show that the stronger notion of trembling-hand perfect equilibria (a subset of
Nash equilibria) does not suffer from the above problem. In fact, trembling-hand perfect equilib-
rium is a notion of equilibrium that is well suited to the purpose of designing efficient and robust
randomized distributed algorithms for LCL tasks. Indeed, trembling-hand perfect equilibria are
limits of Nash equilibria of perturbed games, that is, games in which players must play completely
mixed strategies (i.e. strategies in which each action has a constant probability of being played).
As such, trembling-hand perfect equilibria do not suffer from the undesirable phenomenons of play-
ers blocking each other for an arbitrarily long time. Indeed, this phenomenon results from weakly
dominated strategies that stick to Nash equilibria in which players repeat the same choices again
and again for an arbitrarily long amount of time.
We prove that all LCL games whose solution can be constructed by a greedy sequential al-
gorithm, such as MIS, (∆ + 1)-coloring, maximal matching, etc., have trembling-hand perfect
equilibria. Specifically, our main result is the following:
Theorem 1 Let L be a greedily constructible locally checkable labeling. The game associated to L
has a symmetric trembling-hand perfect equilibrium.
This result is achieved by establishing a general result, of independent interest, stated below as
a lemma:
Lemma 1 Every infinite, continuous, measurable, well-rounded, symmetric extensive game with
perfect recall and finite action set has a symmetric trembling-hand perfect equilibrium.
Our results open a new line of research aiming at designing distributed algorithms that are not
only efficient, but also robust to selfish behaviors of the nodes. Indeed, Theorem 1 establishes that
such algorithms exist, for all “natural” locally checkable labeling (LCL) tasks.
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1.3 Additional Related Work
The readers interested in specific important distributed network computing problems such as MIS
and (∆ + 1)-coloring are invited to consult [9, 12, 15] and the references therein for the most recent
advances in the field. See also [31] for a survey, and [5, 8, 21] for results on derandomization
techniques for LCL tasks.
Other forms of game theoretic approaches have been studied in the past, in the context of
distributed computing, and/or using a distributed computing approach for solving graph problems.
In [6], the authors study programming incentives to the programmers for writing codes that are
efficient for the overall system while optimizing individual programs performances, in the context
of transactional memory. In [2], the authors describe and analyze ways of computing max-cuts by
interpreting these cuts as the pure Nash equilibria of an n-player non-zero sum game, each vertex
being an agent trying to maximize her selfish interest.
The papers the most closely related to our work are [23, 24, 25]. In the survey [23], the
author addresses several problems related to distributed computing, under a large spectrum of
different models. It is shown that standard mechanism design techniques (e.g., Vickrey-Groves-
Clark mechanism) can be applied to some of these problems. However, such an application requires
a central authority which knows everything about the system, except of course the players private
information. On the other hand, the paper also describes and analyzes a two-step algorithm for
solving MIS on paths, where the players are bounded to communicate only with their neighbors.
The algorithms however requires a trusted entity that distributes payments to the players. The
class of best-response mechanisms is studied in [25]. Such mechanisms apply to strategic games
with a unique equilibrium, in which the players proceed by repeatedly best-respond to each other.
Several important problems can be casted in this framework, including the BGP protocol, TCP-
like games, among others. However, for applying the mechanism, the underlying game must have a
unique equilibrium (plus other technical conditions), and the players are oblivious about the time
required to compute the solution. Even the first condition alone may not be satisfied by LCL games
(it is typically not satisfied by the MIS game).
In contrast to the above, our setting does not assume any central entity nor payments, it applies
to general graphs and to all “natural” LCL tasks (including MIS). We prove the existence of suited
algorithms in this general setting.
2 LCL Games
2.1 LCL languages
Our framework is distributed network computing, for which we adopt the following standard setting
(see, e.g., [10]). Let A be a finite alphabet. A network configuration is a pair (G, s) whereG = (V,E)
is a simple connected graph, and s : V → A is a state function, assigning a state s(v) ∈ A to every
node v ∈ V . A distributed language over a graph family F is a Turing computable set L of
configurations such that, for every graph G ∈ F , there is a state function s for which (G, s) ∈ L.
The class LCL, for locally checkable labeling, has been defined in [21]. Let ∆ ≥ 2, and let F∆ be
the family of simple connected graphs with maximum degree ∆. An LCL language over F∆ is a
distributed language defined by a set of balls of radius at most t in graphs belonging to F∆, for
some t ≥ 0, with nodes labeled by values in A. These balls are called the good balls of L. The set
of good balls of an LCL language L is denoted by good(L). The parameter t is called the radius
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of L. Throughout the paper, we shall solely consider graphs with degrees upper bounded by some
∆ ≥ 2, and thus we ignore the index ∆ in F∆ in the following.
For instance, MIS is the LCL language of radius 1 with A = {0, 1}, where good(L) is the set of
balls with radius 1 centered at a node v, such that either s(v) = 0 and there exists a neighbor w
of v with s(w) = 1, or s(v) = 1 and s(w) = 0 for every neighbor w of v. Similarly, (∆ + 1)-coloring
is the LCL language of radius 1 with A = {1, . . . ,∆ + 1}, where good(L) is the set of balls with
radius 1 whose center v satisfies s(v) 6= s(w) for every neighbor w of v.
Every LCL language L induces an associated construction task. Given G ∈ F , each of its
nodes v has to compute a value s(v) ∈ A such that (G, s) ∈ L. In order to guarantee the existence
of efficient distributed algorithms for solving the task induced by L, we consider a subclass of
LCL languages, called greedily constructible. Roughly, an LCL language L is greedily constructible
if any partial solution can be extended. More formally, let us consider an extra value ⊥, whose
interpretation is that a node v with s(v) = ⊥ has not yet decided an output value in A. For a
language L of radius t, a radius-t ball B is said to be partially good if B is resulting from a good ball
by replacing the value of some of its node labels by ⊥. Let G = (V,E) ∈ F , and let s : V → A∪{⊥}
for which all balls in (G, s) are partially good. Let U = {v ∈ V : s(v) = ⊥}, and let s′ : V → A be
such that s′(v) = s(v) for all nodes v ∈ V \U . We call such a function s′ an extension of s. Let U ′
be composed of all nodes in U whose balls in (G, s′) are good, and let s′′ : V → A∪{⊥} be defined
as s′′(v) = s(v) for v ∈ V \ U , s′′(v) = ⊥ for v ∈ U \ U ′, and s′′(v) = s′(v) for v ∈ U ′. An LCL
language L is greedily constructible if for every such G and s such that U 6= ∅, we have (1) there
exists an extension s′ of s such that s′′ 6= s, and, (2) for every extension s′ of s such that s′′ 6= s, all
balls in (G, s′′) are partially good. For instance, k-coloring is greedily constructible for any k > ∆,
while ∆-coloring is not (even in ∆-colorable graphs). MIS and maximal matching also fall into this
class as long as we enforce that nodes (resp., edges) cannot decide by themselves not to enter the
MIS (resp., matching), but can only do so after a neighbor has entered the MIS (resp., matching).
2.2 A generic randomized algorithm for LCL languages
The generic randomized construction algorithm for LCL languages described in this subsection is
conceived for the classical local model of distributed computation [27]. Recall that this model
assumes that all nodes start simultaneously, and perform synchronously in a sequence of rounds.
At each round, every node exchanges information with its neighbors, and performs individual
computations. This goes on at every node until the node decides some output value, and terminates.
The nodes do not need to terminate at the same round. However, the output value of a terminated
node is irrevocable. Our generic algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Generic algorithm executed at a node v.
1: val(v)← ⊥
2: observe ball(v)
3: while ball(v) /∈ good(L) do
4: set val(v) ∈ A compatible with ball(v), at random, according to a probability distribution D
5: observe ball(v)
6: end while
7: return val(v)
In Algorithm 1, every node v aims at computing val(v) ∈ A. It starts with initial value
val(v) = ⊥. At Step 2 node v collects the t-ball ball(v) around it, i.e., the values of all the labels of
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nodes at distance at most t from it, including the structure of the ball, where t is the radius of L.
(This can be implemented in t rounds in the local model). At Step 3, node v checks whether
the observed ball, ball(v), is good. If not, then Step 4 consists for v to select a random value
val(v) ∈ A compatible with ball(v), i.e., with values of nodes in the ball fixed at previous rounds.
The random choice of val(v) is governed by a probability distribution D, which may depend on
the round, and on the structure of v’s neighborhood as observed during the previous rounds. In
the case of MIS, this choice essentially consists in choosing whether v proposes itself for entering
the MIS, with probability pv. Luby’s algorithm [19] sets pv =
1
2 deg(v) where deg(v) is the degree
of v in the graph, not counting the neighbors which already decided at previous rounds. Similarly,
in the case of (∆ + 1)-coloring, the choice of val(v) essentially consists in proposing a color at
random. Barenboim-Elkin’s algorithm [3] sets the probability pc of proposing color c as
1
2 for c = 0
(a “fake” color), and pc =
1
2k for any of the k colors c ∈ {1, . . . ,∆ + 1} that have not yet been
decided by some neighboring node(s) during the previous rounds. Once the new value val(v) has
been selected, node v observes ball(v) in Step 5, including all selected values of nodes in this ball.
If the selected values by the nodes in this ball make the ball good, then v terminates and outputs
val(v). Otherwise, v starts a new iteration of the while-loop.
For any greedily constructible language L, the algorithm terminates (i.e., all nodes return a
value) as long as every value in A has non zero probability to be chosen, and the collective output
val = {val(v), v ∈ V } is such that (G, val) ∈ L for any graph G = (V,E). The performances of
the algorithm (i.e., how many rounds it takes until all nodes terminate) however depends on the
choice of the probability distributions D chosen by each node v ∈ V at each round. For instance,
in the case of MIS, the algorithm converges if every node v proposes itself to enter the MIS with
probability pv =
1
2 . However, the choice pv =
1
2 deg(v) as in Luby’s algorithm guaranties a much
faster convergence: O(log n) rounds, w.h.p., in n-node networks.
2.3 A distributed game for LCL languages
Let L be a greedily constructible LCL language of radius t. L is associated to a game, that we
call LCL game, and that we define as follows (for a more formal definition, see Section 5.1). Let G
be a connected simple graph. Every node v of G is a rational and selfish player, playing the game
with the ultimate goal of maximizing its payoff. Roughly, a strategy for a node v is a probability
distribution D over the values in A compatible with the t-ball centered at v such as observed by v,
employed at Step 4 in Algorithm 1, which may depend on the history of v during the execution of
the algorithm.
As mention in the introduction, we want the payoff of the nodes to reflect the tension between
the objective of every node to compute a global solution rapidly (for this global solution brings
benefits to every node), and its objective of avoiding certain forms of solutions (which may not be
desirable from an individual perspective). So, to define the payoff of a node, we denote by pref a
preference function, which is an abstraction of how much a node will ”suffer” in the future according
to a computed solution. For instance, in the MIS game, for a computed MIS I, we could have, e.g.,
pref(I) = 1 from a node not in I, and pref(I) = 0 for a node in I. In general, for G = (V,E), we
define pref : good(L)→ R+ by associating to each ball B ∈ good(L), the preference pref(B) of the
center of ball B. The payoff function piv of node v at the completion of the algorithm is decaying
with the number k of iterations of the while-loop in Algorithm 1 before the algorithm terminates.
More precisely, we set piv = δ
k pref(Bv) where 0 < δ < 1, Bv is the t-ball centered at v returned
by Algorithm 1, and k is the number of while-loop iterations performed by Algorithm 1 before all
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nodes in Bv output their values. The choice of δ ∈ (0, 1) reflects the tradeoff between the quality
of the solution from the nodes’ perspective, and their desire to construct a global solution. Note
that k is at least the time it took for v to decide a value in A, and at most the time it took for the
algorithm to terminate at all nodes. If the algorithm does not terminate around v, that is, if the
t-ball around v remains perpetually undecided in at least one of its nodes, then we set piv = 0.
The payoff of a node v will thus be large if all nodes in its t-ball decide quickly (i.e., k is small),
and if the computed t-ball Bv suits node v (i.e., pref(Bv) is large). Conversely, if v or another
node in its t-ball takes many rounds before deciding a value (i.e., k is large), or if node v is not
satisfied by the computed solution Bv (i.e., pref(Bv) is small), then the payoff of v will be small.
In particular, if pref(B) = pref(B′) for every good balls B and B′, then maximizing the payoff is
equivalent to completing the task quickly. Instead, if pref(B) is very small for some good balls
B, then nodes might be willing to slow down the completion of the task, with the objective of
avoiding being the center of these balls, in order to maximize their payoff. That is, such nodes
may bias their distribution D towards preferred good balls, even if this is to the price of increasing
the probability of conflicting with the choices of neighboring nodes, resulting in more iterations for
reaching convergence.
As mentioned before, a strategy of a node at one iteration of Algorithm 1 is a distribution of
probability over the values in A, which may depend on the history of the node at any point in
time during the execution of Algorithm 1. Note that, at the kth iteration of the while-loop, every
node v has acquired knowledge about its environment at distance kt in the actual graph, where t
is the radius of the considered language. Importantly, the strategies depend only on the knowledge
accumulated by the nodes along the execution of the algorithm. In particular, the fact that nodes
might be given distinct identities, as in the local model, is ignored by the nodes to set their
strategies, but used only for distinguishing the nodes in the network, in a way similar to the way
classical randomized distributed algorithms perform. In fact, at the beginning of the algorithm,
player v does not even know which node she will play in the network, and just knows that the
network belong to some given graph family F .
A first question of interest is whether there a way to assign a strategy profile to the nodes so
that no nodes will have incentive to deviate from their given individual strategies? In other words,
do there exist Nash equilibria for LCL games?
3 The nature of LCL games
3.1 LCL games as forms of extensive games with imperfect information
Table 1 surveys the existence theorems for equilibria in various game settings, from the finite
strategic games to the extensive games with imperfect information. We restrict our attention to
games with a finite number of players (for games with infinitely many players, see [26]). Trem-
bling hand equilibria are refinements of sequential equilibria, which are themselves refinements of
subgame-perfect equilibria, all of them being Nash equilibria.
In Table 1, we distinguish strategic games (i.e., 1-step games like, e.g., prisoner’s dilemma)
from extensive games (i.e., game trees with payoffs, like, e.g., monetary policy in economy). For
the latter class, we also distinguish games with perfect information (i.e., every player knows exactly
what has taken place earlier in the game), from the games with imperfect information. LCL games
belongs to the class of extensive games with imperfect information, since a node plays arbitrarily
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Strategic Games Extensive games with Extensive games with
perfect information imperfect information
Selten, 1965 [29] Selten, 1975 [30]
Finite games Nash, 1950 [22] Subgame-perfect equilibrium Trembling-hand perfect eq.
Nash equilibrium Pure strategies Behavior strategies
Games with Mixed strategies Fudenberg, Levine, 83 [11] Fudenberg, Levine, 83 [11]
a finite Subgame-perfect equilibrium Sequential equilibrium
action set Pure strategies Behavior strategies
Games with Fan, 1952 [7] Harris, 1985 [14] Chakrabarti, 1992 [4]
an infinite Glicksberg, 1952 [13] Subgame-perfect equilibrium Nash equilibrium
action set Nash equilibrium Pure strategies Behavior strategies
Mixed strategies
Table 1: A summary of main results about the existence of equilibria
many times, and is not necessarily aware of the actions taken by far away nodes in the network.
In Table 1, we also distinguish finite games (i.e., games with a finite number of pure strategies
and finite number of repetitions) from games with infinite horizon (i.e., games which can be repeated
infinitely often). The latter class of games is also split into games with finite numbers of actions,
and games with infinite set of actions (like, e.g., when fixing the price of a product). LCL games
belongs to the class of games with infinite horizon and finite action set: the horizon is infinite since
neighboring nodes may perpetually prevent each other from terminating, and the action set A is
supposed to be finite.
The previous work most closely related to our framework is [11]. Indeed, as was said before,
LCL games are extensive games with imperfect information, and finite action set. Fudenberg and
Levine [11] proved that every such game, under specific assumptions, has a sequential equilibrium
(in behavioral strategies). The class of games for which this holds is best described as extensive
games with observable actions, simultaneous moves, perfect recall and a finite action set, plus some
continuity requirements. As a consequence, the result in [11] does not directly apply to LCL games.
Indeed, first, in LCL games the actions of far-away nodes are not observable. Second, the imperfect
information in [11] is solely related to the fact that players play simultaneously, while, again, in
LCL games, imperfect information also refers to the fact that each node is not aware of the states
of far away nodes in the network. Before showing how to extend [11] to LCL games, we discuss
next of the types of equilibria which should be sought in the context of LCL games.
3.2 Nash equilibria do not capture efficient distributed computation
We consider two important notions of Nash equilibria: the weakest form of equilibrium is the
eponym Nash equilibrium while the strongest form of Nash equilibrium is the trembling-hand
perfect equilibrium. The following result indicates that the basic notion of Nash equilibria is too
weak as far as the design of efficient algorithms for LCL tasks is concerned.
Proposition 1 For every k ≥ 1, there is an LCL game Γ(k) for a task solvable in at most r rounds
with probability at least 1− 12r for every r ≥ 1, and a Nash equilibria for Γ(k) which systematically
requires at least k rounds to converge.
Proof. We show that this negative result holds even for a task on the 2-node graph K2. Recall
that, in a strategic game, a strategy si of player i is strongly dominated by another strategy ti if, for
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every strategy profile s′−i of the other players, the respective payoffs satisfy pii(si, s
′
−i) < pii(ti, s
′
−i).
The strategy si is weakly dominated by ti if pii(si, s
′
−i) ≤ pii(ti, s′−i) for every strategy profile s′−i and
pii(si, s
′′
−i) < pii(ti, s
′′
−i) for at least one strategy profile s
′′
−i. Dominated strategies are undesirable,
and it is usually assumed that rational players never play dominated strategies. Neverthless, while
Nash equilibria cannot contain strongly dominated strategies, they may contain weakly dominated
strategies. The strategic game defined in Fig. 1(left) is an example of such an issue. We call this
game the constrained coloring game. Each of the two players has choice between three frequencies,
namely green (G), red (R), and blue (B). To maximize their payoffs, the players should better
have one playing blue, and the other playing green.
R G B
0, 0
1, 1
1, 1
R
G
B
0, 0 0, 0
0, 00, 0
0, 0 0, 0
sk sˆ s0
δk ≤ δk
≥ δk 1δk
δk
≤ δk ≥ δk
sk
sˆ
s0
Figure 1: Left: The 2-player strategic game called constrained coloring; Right: Payoffs in the LCL
game induced by constrained coloring
The game defined in Fig. 1(left) has four Nash equilibria: (R,R) with payoffs (0, 0), (G,B)
with payoffs (1, 1), (B,G) with payoffs (1, 1), and (G+B2 ,
G+B
2 ) with payoffs (
1
2 ,
1
2). The Nash
equilibrium (R,R) is not realistic since the strategy R is weakly dominated by both G and B. We
show that such weakly dominated strategy are generally undesirable in LCL games since they can
have dramatic consequences on the convergence time of the algorithm.
Consider the LCL game played by two players linked by an edge, inspired from the strategic
game constrained coloring of Fig. 1(left). Every node has the choice between three colors: green,
blue, and red. A radius-1 ball is good if and only if the two nodes have different colors. However,
the cost of the good balls differ. A good ball including color red has low preference. All other good
balls have higher preferences. Specifically, the two players have the same payoff function depending
on their colors. At the first round, the payoffs are
• (2− δ, 2− δ) when one player is green and the other is blue,
• (δk, δk) when one player is red and the other green or blue,
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor of the game, and k is a positive integer parameter. In the case
of a collision, another round of the game is played, and the payoffs are discounted by a factor δ.
The tree structure of the game is represented in Fig. 2, where the triangles are self-similar
representation of the same tree, with payoff discounted by a multiplicative factor δ. The tree is
thus infinite. The figure also describes the different payoffs after the first round.
As it can be read on Fig. 2, if the players choose their actions among (R,G), (R,B), (G,R)
and (B,R), then the game ends after the first round, and each player receives a payoff of δk. If the
players choose their actions among (G,B) and (B,G), then the game also ends, but each player
receives a payoff of 2 − δ. Finally, if the players choose their actions among (R,R), (G,G) and
(B,B), then game carries on, with payoffs discounted by a factor δ.
In this game, since each player is fully informed of the history of the play after any given round,
a pure strategy of a player is simply an infinite sequence of actions. Let us denote by S the set of
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12 2 2
R G B
R G B R G B R G B
δk δk δk δk2− δ 2− δ
Figure 2: Tree structure of the LCL game inspired by constrained coloring
all pure strategies. A mixed strategy of a player is an infinite sequence of probability distributions
over the set of actions {R,G,B}. Let us denote by Sˆ the set of all mixed strategies. From Kuhn’s
theorem [17], it follows that Sˆ is actually equal to the set of all probability distributions over S.
We will pay particular attention to the strategies
sl = (R, . . . , R︸ ︷︷ ︸
l
,
G+B
2
,
G+B
2
, . . . ),
which consist in playing the action R for the first l rounds, and then playing indefinitely the mixed
strategy G+B2 . All sequences are indexed from 0. For every sequence s, and for every positive
integer i, the sequence s|i denotes the sequence resulting from s after removing the i first actions,
and reindexing the actions (i, i + 1, . . . ) in s|i as (0, 1, . . . ). Let us now compute the equilibria in
the LCL game induced by constrained coloring. We denote by Π : S2 7→ R the expected payoff
function of the game (note that the players always receive the same payoff).
Fact 1 Let s ∈ S be a pure strategy. If R is never played in s, then Π(s0, s) = Π(s, s0) = 1.
Otherwise, let t be the first round in which the action R is played in s. We have
Π(s0, s) = Π(s, s0) = 1−
(
δ
2
)t
(1− δk).
Indeed, if the first action in s is R, then the game ends in the first round, and Π(s, s0) = δk. So, let
us assume that the first action in s is G or B. Then, with probability 12 , the game ends, and each
player gets payoff 2− δ. Similarly, with probability 12 , another round is played. Since s0|1 = s0, we
get the following recurrence relation:
Π(s, s0) =
1
2
(2− δ) + 1
2
δ Π(s|1, s0).
This recurrence yields
Π(s, s0) =
2− δ
2
t−1∑
i=0
(
δ
2
)i
+
(
δ
2
)t
δk =
2− δ
2
(
1− ( δ2)t
1− δ2
)
+
(
δ
2
)t
δk = 1−
(
1− δk
)(δ
2
)t
as desired.
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Fact 2 Let s ∈ S be a pure strategy. Let t′ be the first round at which action G or B is played in
s, and let t′′ be the first round at which action R is played in s|k.
Π(sk, s) = Π(s, sk) =

δt
′+k if t′ < k
δ2k if t′ > k
δk
(
1− ( δ2)t′′ (1− δk)) if t′ = k
Indeed, if the first action in s is G or B, then the game ends in the first round and Π(s, sk) = δk.
Let us assume that the first action in s is R, then the next round is played, and Π(s, sk) = δ(s|1, sk|1).
Fact 2 then follows from Fact 1.
Note that it was sufficient to establish the above facts for pure strategies since, for any two
mixed strategies sˆ1 and sˆ2, there exist two pure strategies s and s
′ in the support of sˆ1 such that
Π(s, sˆ2) ≤ Π(sˆ1, sˆ2) ≤ Π(s′, sˆ2). The following fact follows from Fact 2, because sk is a best response
to itself as it yields the highest payoff δk.
Fact 3 The strategy profile (sk, sk) is a Nash equilibrium.
Finally, the following completes our analysis of the LCL game induced by constrained coloring.
Fact 4 The strategy sk is (weakly) dominated by the strategy s0.
To see why the fact holds, let s ∈ S be a pure strategy and t be the first round in which the action
R is played in s. Since δ < 1, we get δk ≤ 1 − (1− δk) ( δ2)t , from which if follows from Fact 1
that Π(s0, s) ≥ δk. Furthermore, from Fact 2, we get that Π(sk, s) ≤ δk. By extension to mixed
strategies, we have that, for every mixed strategy sˆ ∈ Sˆ, we have Π(s0, sˆ) ≥ Π(sk, sˆ). It remains to
show that there exists a mixed strategy sˆ ∈ Sˆ such that Π(s0, sˆ) > Π(sk, sˆ). This is achieved for
example by sˆ = s0. Indeed by Fact 1, we have Π(s0, s0) = 1 and Π(sk, s0) = δk which completes
the proof of Fact 4.
The above claims are summarized in Fig. 1(right), where sˆ represents any mixed strategy not
in {s0, sk}. The strategy profile (sk, sk) is a Nash equilibrium. For this strategy profile, the LCL
game induced by constrained coloring requires at least k rounds to converge because both players
systematically play action R for the first k rounds. On the other hand, The strategy profile (s0, s0)
allows convergence in constant expected number of rounds, and converges in at most r rounds with
probability at least 1− 12r . 
3.3 Trembling-hand perfect equilibria do capture efficient distributed compu-
tation
We have seen in Proposition 1 that focussing solely on Nash equilibria in a broad sense is not
sufficient. Indeed, such equilibria can include weakly dominated strategies, and this may have a
dramatic impact on the convergence time of the algorithm. Such problem can be eliminated by
considering the stronger notion of trembling-hand perfect equilibrium (a subset of Nash equilibria).
Indeed, recall that a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium of a game Γ is a Nash equilibrium which is
the limit of Nash equilibria of perturbed games Γ,  > 0, where Γ is essentially the game Γ but in
which the players can set their strategies only up to some error . It is known that trembling-hand
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perfect equilibria avoid pathological scenarios in general extensive games [11, 30], mostly because
these equilibria never include weakly dominated strategies, as a weakly dominated strategy can
never be a best response to a completely mixed strategy profile. In other words, in the perturbed
game Γ, all players must give a probability at least  to every action. For instance, in the perturbed
LCL game for MIS, no nodes can systematically propose not to be in the MIS, and must propose to
enter the MIS with probability at least  at each round. Similarly, in the perturbed LCL game for
(∆+1)-coloring, every color must have a probability at least  to be proposed. As a third example,
one can show that, for the LCL games Γ(k), k ≥ 1, whose existences are established in the proof
of Proposition 1, the trembling-hand perfect equilibria yield algorithms converging quickly. More
specifically, we have the following:
Proposition 2 For all the LCL games Γ(k), k ≥ 1, on the 2-node graph K2 whose existences are
established in Proposition 1, the trembling-hand perfect equilibria yield algorithms converging in at
most r rounds, with probability at least 1− 12r , for any r ≥ 1.
Proof. Fig. 3 illustrates the notion of trembling-hand perfect equilibria for the LCL game con-
strained coloring defined in the proof of Proposition 1. In Fig. 3, any point in the triangle BRG
represents a distribution D of probability in the set {B,R,G} of colors. In Γ, these distributions
are bounded to be at least  away from the boundaries, hence they are inside the triangle with
dotted line borders. In Γ, all equilibria correspond to strategy profiles where the strategy of every
player stands on the bottom line marked in bold in this latter triangle. Hence, the Nash equilibrium
(sk, sk) cannot be the limit, when  goes to 0, of equilibria in Γ. Indeed, the corner R cannot be
the limit of points in the bold line, as this line actually converges to the line GB. Therefore, the
undesirable Nash equilibrium (sk, sk) is not a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium of the LCL game
for constrained coloring.
G
R
Bε
D
Figure 3: Illustration of trembling hand perfect equilibrium
On the other hand, we know from Fact 4 that sk is weakly dominated by s0. In particular, the
strategy profile (s0, s0) is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium for the game stated in Proposition 1,
and this strategy profile allows the game to converge in a constant expected number of rounds. 
In general, in a perturbed LCL game, no player can block the game for an arbitrarily long time
by strictly refusing to select a solution that does not please it. Now, can we always guarantee the
existence of trembling hand perfect equilibria in LCL games? In the next sections, we show that
the answer to this question is positive.
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4 Existence of trembling-hand perfect equilibria
In this section, for the purpose of establishing the existence of trembling-hand perfect equilibria
for LCL-games, we extend the result of [11] by allowing actions of other players be not observable,
which also requires to generalize the notion of rounds as well as the notion of imperfect information,
such as used in [11].
Lemma 1 Every infinite, continuous, measurable, well-rounded, symmetric extensive game with
perfect recall and finite action set has a symmetric trembling-hand perfect equilibrium.
The rest of the section is dedicated to the proof of Lemma 1. We start by formally defining the
model.
4.1 The Model
We focus our attention on extensive games with imperfect information. Our objective is to in-
clude infinite horizon in the analysis of such games. Recall that an extensive game Γ is a tuple
(N,A,X, P, U, p, pi), where:
• N = {1, . . . , n} is the set representing the players of the game. An additional player, denoted
by c, and called chance, is modeling all random effects that might occur in the course of the
game.
• A is the (finite) action set, i.e., a finite set representing the actions that can be made by each
player when she has to play.
• X is the game tree, that is, a subset of A∗ ∪Aω where A∗ (resp., Aω) denotes the set of finite
(resp., infinite) strings with elements in A, satisfying the following properties:
– the empty sequence ∅ ∈ X;
– X is stable by prefix;
– if (ai)i=1,...,k ∈ X for every k ≥ 1, then (ai)i≥1 ∈ X.
The set X is partially ordered by the prefix relation, denoted by , where x  y means that
x is a prefix of y, and x ≺ y means that x is a prefix of y distinct from y. The elements of
X are called histories. A history x is terminal if it is a prefix of no other histories in X. In
particular, every infinite history in X is terminal. The set of terminal histories is denoted by
Z. If the longest history is finite then the game has finite horizon, otherwise it has infinite
horizon. For every non-terminal history x, we denote by
A(x) = {a ∈ A : (x, a) ∈ X}
the set of available actions after the history x.
• P is the player partition, i.e., a function P : X \ Z → N ∪ {c} that assigns a player to
each non-terminal history. P (x) is the player who has to play after the history x. The sets
Pi = {x ∈ X \ Z : P (x) = i}, i ∈ N ∪ {c}, called player sets, form a partition of X \ Z.
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• U is the information partition, that is, a refinement of the player partition whose elements
are called information sets such that for every u ∈ U , and for every two histories x, y in this
information set u, we have A(x) = A(y), i.e., the sets of available actions after x and y are
identical. We can therefore define A(u) as the set of actions available after the information
set u. Formally,
A(u) = {a ∈ A : (x, a) ∈ X for every x ∈ u}.
For every history x, the information set containing x is denoted by u(x). We also define
P (u) as the player who has to play after the information set u has been reached, and for
every player i, the set Ui = {u ∈ U : P (u) = i}. {Ui, i ∈ N ∪ {c}} forms a partition of
U . Information sets regroup histories that are indistinguishable to players. Since the player
chance is not expected to behave rationally, we will simply put Uc = {{x}, x ∈ Pc}.
• p is a function that assigns to every history x in Pc (the player set of the chance) a probability
distribution over the set A(x) of available actions after the history x. This chance function p
is supposed to be common knowledge among the players.
• pi is the payoff function, that is, pi : Z → Rn assigns the payoff (a real value) to every player
in N for every terminal history of the game. We assume that every payoff is in [−M,M ] for
some M ≥ 0.
We introduce the concept of rounds in extensive games as follows.
Definition 1 The round function r of an extensive game assigns a positive integer to every non
terminal history x, defined by r(x) = |Rec(x)| where Rec(x) = {x′ ∈ X | x′ ≺ x and P (x′) = P (x)}.
We call r(x) the round of x. The round of a finite terminal history is the round of its predecessor,
and the round of an infinite history z is r(z) = ∞. An extensive game Γ for which the round
function is non decreasing with respect to the prefix relation, i.e y  x⇒ r(y) ≤ r(x), is said to be
well-rounded.
Note that not every game is well-rounded, because two histories x and y such that x  y do not
necessarily verify P (x) = P (y). In a well-rounded game, since r is non decreasing, we have that
for any non terminal history x, every player has played at most r(x) + 1 times before x. Moreover,
every player which has played less than r(x) times before x will never play again after x.
Let u ∈ Ui and u′ ∈ Ui be two (non necessarily distinct) information sets of the same player i,
for which there exist x ∈ u, x′ ∈ u′, and a ∈ A(u′), such that (x′, a)  x. Recall that an extensive
game is said to have perfect recall if, for every such i, u, u′ and a, we have:
∀y ∈ u,∃y′ ∈ u′ | (y′, a)  y.
The following lemma will allow us to safely talk about the round of an information set.
Lemma 2 Let Γ be an extensive game with perfect recall, and let x ∈ X and x′ ∈ X be two non
terminal histories in the same information set u ∈ U . Then x and x′ have the same round.
Proof. We first observe the following. Let Γ be an extensive game with perfect recall, and let
y ∈ X be a finite history. Let y′ ∈ X and y′′ ∈ X for which there is u ∈ U such that y′ ∈ Rec(y)∩u
and y′′ ∈ Rec(y) ∩ u. Then y′ = y′′. Indeed, since both y′ and y′′ are in Rec(y), we have that both
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are prefixes of y, and thus one of the two is a prefix of the other. Assume, w.l.o.g., that y′′ ≺ y′ ≺ y
(as, if y′ = y′′ then we are done). Let a be the action such that (y′′, a)  y′. Since the game has
perfect recall, there must exist a history y′′′ ∈ u such that (y′′′, a)  y′′. Thus y′′′ ≺ y′′ ≺ y′ ≺ y.
We can repeat the same reasoning for y′′′ and y′′ as we did for y′′ and y′, so on and so forth. In
this way, we construct an infinite strictly decreasing sequence of histories, which contradicts the
fact that y is finite.
If both Rec(x) and Rec(x′) are empty, then x and x′ have the same round. Assume, w.l.o.g.,
that Rec(x) 6= ∅, and let y ∈ Rec(x). Let a be the action such that (y, a)  x. Since the
game has perfect recall, there exists y′ ∈ u(x′) such that (y′, a)  x′. Therefore y′ ≺ x′ and
P (y′) = P (y) = P (x) = P (x′). It follows that y′ ∈ Rec(x′). Thus, for any y ∈ Rec(x), we have
found an y′ ∈ Rec(x′). This mapping from Rec(x) to Rec(x′) is one to one. Indeed, let y1 and
y2 in Rec(x), and let y
′
1 and y
′
2 in Rec(x
′) be the corresponding histories. If y′1 = y′2, then, since
u(y1) = u(y
′
1) and u(y2) = u(y
′
2) = u(y
′
1), we get that y1 ∈ Rec(x) ∩ u(y′1), y2 ∈ Rec(x) ∩ u(y′1).
It follows from the above observation that y1 = y2. Thus the mapping is one-to-one, and hence
r(x) ≤ r(x′). It follows that we also have Rec(x′) 6= ∅. Therefore, we can apply the same reasoning
by switching the roles of x and x′, which yields r(x′) ≤ r(x). Thus r(x) = r(x′). 
4.2 Strategies, Outcomes and Expected Payoff
In this section, we first recall several basic concepts about extensive games with perfect recall.
Without loss of generality, we restrict our attention to behavioral strategies since such strategies
are outcome-equivalent to mixed strategies thanks to Kuhn’s theorem [18]. The main objective of
this section is to define the expected payoff function, which is novel for it is adapted to the infinite
games.
Recall that the local strategy bi,u of a player i given the information sets u is a probability
distribution over the set A(u) of actions available given this information set. The set of local
strategies of player i for u is denoted by Bi,u. The behavioral strategy bi of a player i is a function
which assigns a local strategy bi,u to every information set u of this player. The set of all behavioral
strategies of player i is denoted by Bi. A strategy profile is a n-tuple of behavioral strategies, one
for each player. The set of all strategy profiles is B = ×i∈NBi. For each player i, we denote by
B−i the set ×j 6=iBj . Since B = Bi ×B−i = ×i∈NBi, a strategy profile b can be identified in these
different ways as b = (bi, b−i) = (b1, b2, . . . , bn). When every player plays according to a strategy
profile b, the outcome of the game in entirely determined, in the sense that every history x has a
probability ρb(x) of being reached. For any strategy profile b and any history x = (ai)i=1,...,k where
k ∈ N ∪∞, the realization probability of x is defined by ρb(∅) = 1, and
ρb(x) =
k−1∏
i=0
bP (xi),u(xi)(ai+1)
where x0 = ∅, and, for every positive i ≤ k, xi = (a1, a2, . . . , ai). When the player is the chance, we
simply identify its strategy with the chance function p: P (xi) = c⇒ bP (xi),u(xi)(ai+1) = p(xi, ai+1)
The function ρb : X → [0, 1] is called the outcome of the game under the strategy profile b. An
outcome ρ : X → [0, 1] is feasible if and only if there exists a strategy profile b such that ρ = ρb.
The set of feasible outcomes of Γ is denoted by O.
We are now ready to define the expected payoff. Note that in a game with infinite horizon, there
can be uncountably many terminal histories. Therefore the definition of the probability measure
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on Z requires some care. For any finite history x, let Zx be the set {z ∈ Z | x  z}. Note that Zx
might be uncountable. Let Σ be the σ-algebra on Z generated by all sets of the form Zx for some
finite history x. For each strategy profile b, the measure µb on Σ is defined by: for every set Zx,
µb(Zx) = ρb(x).
This definition ensures that µb is a probability measure because µb(Z) = µb(Z∅) = ρb(∅) = 1.
Definition 2 Let pi be a payoff function that is measurable on Σ. The expected payoff function Π
assigns a real value Π(b) to every strategy profile b ∈ B, defined by
Π(b) =
∫
Σ
pi dµb .
Note that each component of the expected payoff function is bounded by M , where M is the upper
bound on every payoff. A game Γ whose payoff function pi is measurable on Σ is said to be a
measurable game. In the following, we always assume that the considered games are measurable.
4.3 -Equilibria and Subgame Perfection
We now show how to adapt the standard notion of -equilibria (cf., e.g., Radner [28]) to infinite
games (again, Nash equilibrium is a special case of -equilibrium, with  = 0). Recall that a strategy
profile b is a -equilibrium if and only if, for every player i, and every behavior strategy b′i ∈ Bi
of this player, we have Πi(b
′
i, b−i) − Πi(b) ≤ . Similarly, we recall the notions of subgames and
subgame perfect equilibria (see, e.g., [29]). A subtree X ′ of X is said to be regular if no information
sets contain both a history in X ′ and a history not in X ′. To each regular subtree X ′ is associated
a game Γ′ = (N,A,X ′, P ′, U ′, p′, pi′), where P ′, U ′, p′ and pi′ are the restrictions of P , U , p and
pi to X ′, called a subgame. The notions of outcomes and expected payoff functions for subgames
follow naturally. Specifically,
Definition 3 A strategy profile b is a subgame perfect -equilibrium of an infinite game Γ if and
only if, for every subgame Γ′, the restriction of b to Γ′ is an -equilibrium.
Note that a subgame perfect -equilibrium of Γ is an -equilibrium since Γ is a subgame of itself.
4.4 Metrics
In this section, we now define specific metrics on the set O of feasible outcomes, and on the set
of behavior strategy profiles. These definitions are inspired from [11], with adaptations to fit our
infinite setting.
Definition 4 Let ρ1, ρ2 ∈ O be two feasible outcomes of the same extensive game Γ. We define
the following metric d on O:
d(ρ1, ρ2) = sup
x∈X
x finite
2−r(x) · ∣∣ρ1(x)− ρ2(x)∣∣
where r(x) is the round of the finite history x.
Lemma 3 The function d : O ×O → R of Definition 4 is indeed a metric.
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Proof. We first show that d satisfies the triangle inequality. Let ρ1, ρ2 and ρ3 be three feasible
outcomes of Γ. For any finite history x we have the following:
|ρ1(x)− ρ3(x)| ≤ |ρ1(x)− ρ2(x)|+ |ρ2(x)− ρ3(x)|
⇒ 2−r(x)|ρ1(x)− ρ3(x)| ≤ 2−r(x)|ρ1(x)− ρ2(x)|+ 2−r(x)|ρ2(x)− ρ3(x)|
⇒ sup
x∈X
x finite
2−r(x)|ρ1(x)− ρ3(x)| ≤ sup
x∈X
x finite
(
2−r(x)|ρ1(x)− ρ2(x)|+ 2−r(x)|ρ2(x)− ρ3(x)|
)
⇒ sup
x∈X
x finite
2−r(x)|ρ1(x)− ρ3(x)| ≤ sup
x∈X
x finite
2−r(x)|ρ1(x)− ρ2(x)|+ sup
x∈X
x finite
2−r(x)|ρ2(x)− ρ3(x)|
⇒ d(ρ1, ρ3) ≤ d(ρ1, ρ2) + d(ρ2, ρ3)
Next, we prove that d separates different outcomes. Let ρ1 and ρ2 be two feasible outcomes such
that d(ρ1, ρ2) = 0. By definition, this implies that, for every finite history x, we have ρ1(x) = ρ2(x).
Let b1 and b2 be two strategy profiles such that ρ1 = ρb1 and ρ
2 = ρb2 . Let x = (ak)k≥1 be an infinite
history, and, for k ≥ 1, let xk = (a1, a2, . . . , ak) be the corresponding increasing sequence of its
prefixes. By definition, ρb1(x) is the limit for k →∞ of the sequence ρb1(xk), and ρb2(xk)→ ρb2(x)
for k → ∞ as well. Since the two sequences are equal they have the same limit, and therefore
ρ1(x) = ρ2(x). Since this is true for any infinite history x, it follows that ρ1 = ρ2. 
We can then use d to define a metric on behavioral strategy profiles as follows. Let b1, b2 ∈ B
be two behavioral strategy profiles of the same game Γ. We define the metric d on B by:
d(b1, b2) = max
{
d (ρb1 , ρb2) , sup
i∈N
bi∈Bi
d
(
ρ(bi,b1−i)
, ρ(bi,b2−i)
)}
Finally, we define the continuity of the expected payoff function using the sup norm over Rn.
Specifically, the expected payoff function Π is continuous if, for every sequence of strategy profiles
(bk)k≥1 and every strategy profile b, we have
d(bk, b) →
k→∞
0 =⇒ sup
i∈N
∣∣∣Πi(bk)−Πi(b)∣∣∣ →
k→∞
0
We then say that an extensive game Γ is continuous if its expected payoff function is continuous.
4.5 Perturbed Games and Perfect Equilibria
In this section, we extend the classical notion of trembling-hand perfect -equilibria to infinite
games, generalizing [30]. We start by revisiting the notion of a perturbed game in the context of
infinite games. A perturbed game Γˆ is a pair (Γ, η), where Γ is an extensive game and η is a function
which assigns a positive probability ηu(a) to every action a available after the information set u
such that
∀u ∈ U,
∑
a∈A(u)
ηu(a) < 1. (1)
The perturbed game Γˆ is to be interpreted as a restriction of the game Γ in the following sense.
The probability ηu(a) is the minimal probability that player P (u) can assign to the action a in his
local strategy at information set u. Therefore we define the set of strategies of the perturbed game
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as follows. In the perturbed game Γˆ, a local strategy bˆi,u of a player i at one of its information sets u
is a probability distribution over the set A(u) of actions available at this information set satisfying:
∀(i, u, a) ∈ N × Ui ×A(u), bˆi,u(a) ≥ ηu(a).
The set of local strategies of player i at the information set u in the perturbed game Γˆ is denoted
by Bˆi,u. Note that Bˆi,u is not reduced to a single strategy thanks to Eq. (1).
From the above, we can define the set Bˆi of behavioral strategies of player i, the set Bˆ of
strategy profiles, and the notion of -equilibria of a perturbed game in the same way as for regular
extensive games.
Definition 5 A strategy profile b∗ is a trembling hand perfect -equilibrium of Γ if
1. there exists a sequence (Γˆk) = (Γ, ηk), k ≥ 1, of perturbations of Γ such that ηk → 0 when
k → ∞ (where ηk → 0 means that, for every player i, every information set u ∈ Ui, and
every action a ∈ A(u), ηku(a)→ 0), and
2. there exists a sequence of -equilibria bˆk of these perturbed games such that bˆk → b∗ when
k →∞ (where bˆk → b∗ in the sense of the metric on behavioral strategy profiles).
Such a sequence (Γˆk)k≥1 of perturbed games is called a test sequence for Γ.
The next lemma shows that the notion of trembling hand perfect -equilibrium is a refinement
of the notion of subgame perfect -equilibrium.
Lemma 4 Every trembling hand perfect -equilibrium of a continuous game is a subgame perfect
-equilibrium.
Proof. We first show that every trembling hand perfect -equilibrium of a continuous game is an
-equilibrium. Let b∗, Γ, Γˆk and bˆk be as in Definition 5. Since bˆk are -equilibria of the games Γˆk,
the following holds:
∀i ∈ N, ∀k,∀bi ∈ Bˆki , Πi(bi, bˆk−i)−Πi(bˆk) ≤ 
Let Bmi be the intersection of all Bˆ
k
i with k ≥ m. Then we have:
∀i ∈ N, ∀k ≥ m,∀bi ∈ Bmi , Πi(bi, bˆk−i)−Πi(bˆk) ≤ 
Since Π is assumed to be continuous, these inequalities remain valid if on both sides, we take the
limits for k →∞:
∀i ∈ N, ∀bi ∈ Bmi , Πi(bi, b∗−i)−Πi(b∗) ≤ 
This holds for every m. The closure of the union of all Bmi is Bi. Since Π is continuous, this yields:
∀i ∈ N, ∀bi ∈ Bi, Πi(bi, b∗−i)−Πi(b∗) ≤ 
as desired.
Moreover, every -equilibrium of a perturbed game is subgame perfect. Indeed, this follows from
the fact that in a perturbed game, every subgame is reached with a strictly positive probability.
We now have all the ingredients to establish the lemma. Let b∗ be a trembling hand perfect
-equilibrium of the game Γ and bˆk a sequence of equilibria of the test sequence Γˆ such that bˆ
k → b∗.
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Every subgame Γ′ of Γ induces a sequence of subgames Γˆ′k of the test sequence. Since every -
equilibrium of a perturbed game is subgame perfect, it follows that the sequence bˆk induces a
sequence of equilibria bˆ′k of these pertubed subgames, which converges to b′∗, the strategy profile
induced by b∗ on Γ′. Therefore b′∗ is a trembling hand perfect -equilibrium of Γ′, which proves
that b∗ is subgame perfect since every trembling hand perfect -equilibrium of a continuous game
is an -equilibrium. 
4.6 Truncated Games and Induced Equilibria
The goal of this section is to introduce the concept of truncation of an infinite game, and to draw
links between equilibria of the truncated (finite) game and the equilibria of the corresponding
infinite game. The purpose of truncation is to deal with finite game that are easier to handle than
infinite ones. The material in this section is a generalization of [11] to extensive games (the original
paper [11] only applies to repeated games).
For every well-rounded extensive game Γ = (N,A,X, P, U, p, pi) with perfect recall, and for
every positive integer t, we define the truncated game Γt = (N,A,Xt, P˜ , U˜ , p˜, Π˜) as follows.
• Xt is the set of all histories x ∈ X of round at most t. The set of terminal histories Z˜ of Γt
is defined as the set of all histories with a predecessor in Xt and no successor in Xt.
• P˜ , U˜ and p˜ are the restrictions of P , U , and p to Xt. Note that these restrictions do not
break information sets thanks to Lemma 2.
• Strategies and strategy profiles of Γ are mapped to strategies and strategy profiles of Γt as
follows.
– Every strategy profile b of Γ is mapped to a strategy profile b˜ of Γt obtained by the
restriction of b to the information sets in Xt. The set of strategy profiles of Γt is denoted
by B˜. The strategy profile b˜ is said to be induced by b.
– Conversely, every strategy profile b˜ of Γt is mapped to the strategy profile b of Γ defined
by
∗ bi,u = b˜i,u for every information set u ∈ U˜ and every player i,
∗ bi,u(a) = 1|A(u)| for every information set u /∈ U˜ , every player i and every action a
(i.e., bi,u is a uniform distribution).
The strategy profile b is said to be induced by b˜.
Note that the first induction mapping is not necessarily one-to-one, while the second is not
necessarily onto.
• In order to define the new payoff function p˜i over the set Z˜, we rather define it implicitly, via
the expected payoff function Π˜ which is set such that, for any strategy profile b˜ ∈ B˜ that
induces b ∈ B, we have Π˜(b˜) = Π(b).
Lemma 5 In a continuous well-rounded game with perfect recall Γ, a strategy profile b∗ is an
-equilibrium if and only if there exists sequences k, tk and bk such that for every k, bk is an
k-equilibrium in Γtk and as k goes to infinity, 
k → , tk →∞ and b′k → b∗, where b′k is induced
by bk on Γ.
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Proof. Given a game Γ, for every t ≥ 1, let
wt = max
i∈N
sup
b1,b2∈B : b˜1=b˜2
∣∣Πi(b1)−Πi(b2)∣∣
where b˜1 = b˜2 stands for the fact that b1 and b2 induce the same strategy profiles over the truncated
game Γt. Note that w
t ≤ 2M for every t ≥ 1.
Claim 1 A continuous game Γ satisfies wt −→
t∞ 0.
To establish the claim, let b1 and b2 be two strategy profiles of Γ which induce the same strategy
profiles over Γt. This implies that for any history x of round at most t and any deviation bi of
some player i, the relations ρb1(x) = ρb2(x) and ρ(bi,b1−i)
(x) = ρ(bi,b2−i)
(x) holds. Therefore by the
definition of the metric d on feasible outcomes (cf. Definition 4) and its extension to behavioral
strategy profiles, we have d(b1, b2) ≤ 2−(t+1). Therefore:
wt ≤ sup
i∈n
b1,b2∈B
d(b1,b2)≤2−(t+1)
∣∣Πi(b1)−Πi(b2)∣∣
And since Γ is continuous,
sup
i∈n
b1,b2∈B
d(b1,b2)≤2−(t+1)
∣∣Πi(b1)−Πi(b2)∣∣ −→
t∞ 0
This completes the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 2 Let Γ be a well-rounded game with perfect recall and Γt its truncation. We have that:
1. Any -equilibrium b˜∗ in Γt induces a (+ wt)-equilibrium in Γ.
2. Any -equilibrium b∗ in Γ induces a (+ 2wt)-equilibrium in Γt.
To establish the first item of the claim, let b˜∗ be an -equilibrium in Γt wich induces b∗ in Γ.
Let i be a player, b′i ∈ Bi a deviation of this player in Γ, b˜i the deviation it induces in Γt and bi the
deviation induced by b˜i in Γ. Since b˜
∗ is an -equilibrium in Γt, we obtain that
Π˜i(b˜i, b˜
∗
−i)− Π˜i(b˜∗) ≤ 
By definition of Π˜, the following holds:
Π˜i(b˜i, b˜
∗
−i) = Πi(bi, b
∗
−i)
Π˜i(b˜
∗) = Πi(b∗)
Furthermore, by definition of wt, we have
Πi(b
′
i, b
∗
−i)−Πi(bi, b∗−i) ≤ wt
19
We eventually arrive at
Πi(b
′
i, b
∗
−i)−Πi(b∗) ≤ + wt
Which proves that b∗ is a (+ wt)-equilibrium, since i is any player and b′i is any deviation in Bi.
To establish the second item of Claim 2, let b∗ be an -equilibrium in Γ, b˜∗ the strategy profile it
induces on Γt, and b
′∗ the strategy profile induced by b˜∗ on Γ. Let i be a player, b˜i ∈ B˜i a deviation
in Γt and bi the deviation it induces in Γ. Because b
∗ is an -equilibrium, we have:
Πi(bi, b
∗
−i)−Πi(b∗) ≤ 
By definition of Π˜, we have:
Π˜i(b˜
∗) = Πi(b′
∗
)
Π˜i(b˜i, b˜
∗
−i) = Πi(bi, b
′
−i
∗
)
And by definition of wt:
Πi(b
′∗)−Πi(b∗) ≤ wt
Πi(bi, b
′∗
−i)−Πi(bi, b∗−i) ≤ wt
The above relations put together eventually gives us:
Π˜i(b˜i, b˜
∗
−i)− Π˜i(b˜∗) ≤ + 2wt
Wich proves that b˜∗ is a (+ 2wt)-equilibrium in Γt. This completes the proof of Claim 2.
Note that Claim 2 applies to perturbed games as well, as long as induced strategy profiles verify
the constraints of the minimal probabilities.
Claim 3 Let bk be a sequence of -equilibria of a continuous well-rounded game with perfect recall
Γ such that bk → b∗. Then b∗ is also an -equilibrium of Γ. In other words, for every , the set of
-equilibria of such a game is closed.
To establish the claim, suppose that b∗ is not an -equilibrium of Γ. Therefore for some player
i and some δ > 0, there exists a deviation bi ∈ Bi such that:
Πi(bi, b
∗
−i)−Πi(b∗) ≥ + 3δ
By continuity of Π, we have for a large enough k:
Πi(b
k)−Πi(b∗) ≤ δ
Πi(bi, b
∗
−i)−Πi(bi, bk−i) ≤ δ
Substracting the two above inequalities to the previous one yields:
Πi(bi, b
k
−i)−Πi(bk) ≥ + δ
which contradicts the premise that bk is an -equilibrium. This completes the proof of Claim 3.
We have now all ingredients to prove the lemma. Assume first that b∗ is an -equilibrium in
Γ and define bk to be the strategy profile induced by b∗ on Γk and b′
k induced by bk on Γ. By
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Claim 2, for every k, bk is a ( + 2wk)-equilibrium in Γk, and by Claim 1, w
k → 0. Furthermore,
d(b′k, b∗) ≤ 2−k by definition of d, therefore b′k → b∗.
Conversely, assume now that there exists such sequences k, tk and bk. By Claim 2, for every k,
the strategy profile b′k induced by bk on Γ is an (k +wtk)-equilibrium in Γ. Since Γ is continuous,
we know by Claim 1 that (k + wt
k
) → . For every δ > 0, we have for every k large enough
k + wt
k ≤  + δ. By Claim 3, this implies that b∗ is a ( + δ)-equilibrium. Since this is true for
every δ > 0, we have shown that b∗ is an -equilibrium in Γ. 
4.7 Truncation of Perturbed Games
The goal of this section is to extend the results of the previous section to trembling hand perfect
-equilibria (instead of just for -equilibria). We define what is the truncation of a perturbed game
in a straightforward way: for every perturbed game Γˆ = (Γ, η) and every positive integer t, the
truncated perturbed game Γˆt is (Γt, η˜), where η˜ is simply the restriction of η to Xt.
Lemma 6 In a continuous game Γ, a strategy profile b∗ is a trembling hand perfect -equilibrium if
and only if there exists sequences k, tk and bk such that for every k, bk is a trembling hand perfect
k-equilibrium in Γtk , and, as k goes to infinity, 
k → , tk →∞ and b′k → b∗, where b′k is induced
by bk on Γ.
Proof. We first show the following.
Claim 4 Let Γ be a continuous game and Γt its truncation.
1. Any trembling hand perfect -equilibrium b˜∗ in Γt induces a trembling hand perfect ( + wt)-
equilibrium in Γ.
2. Any trembling hand perfect -equilibrium b∗ in Γ induces a trembling hand perfect (+ 2wt)-
equilibrium in Γt.
For proving the first item of Claim 4, let b˜∗ be a trembling hand perfect -equilibrium in Γt. By
definition of a trembling hand perfect equilibrium, there exists b˜k a sequence of -equilibrium of a
test sequence Γˆkt = (Γt, η˜
k) of the game Γt, such that b˜
k → b˜∗. This test sequence can be extended
into a sequence of infinite games Γˆk = (Γ, ηk) by choosing the same minimal probabilities for any
information set of round at most t, and for every information set u of round greater than t and any
action a ∈ A(u), define ηku(a) = 2
−k
|A(u)| . Therefore the sequence Γˆ
k is by definition a test sequence
of Γ. Furthermore, ηk was defined such that Claim 2 applies: the strategy profiles bk induced by
b˜k are therefore (+wt)-equilibria of Γˆkt . We also have that b
k is induced by b˜k, b∗ is induced by b˜∗
and b˜k → b˜∗, therefore bk → b∗. This proves that b∗ is a trembling hand perfect (+wt)-equilibrium
of Γ.
For proving the second item of Claim 4, let b∗ be a trembling hand perfect -equilibrium in Γ.
By definition, there exists a sequence bk of -equilibria of a test sequence Γˆk of Γ such that bk → b∗.
For k large enough, the following is true:
∀u ∈ U,∀a ∈ A(u), ηku(a) ≤
1
|A(u)|
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Therefore we can apply Claim 2: the strategy profiles b˜k induced by bk in Γˆkt are (+2w
t)-equilibria.
Obviously Γˆkt is a test sequence for Γt. And since b˜
k is induced by bk, b˜∗ is induced by b∗ and
bk → b∗, we know that b˜k converges to b˜∗. Which proves that b˜∗ is a ( + 2wt)-equilibrium in Γt.
This completes the proof of Claim 4.
Claim 5 Let bk be a sequence of trembling hand perfect -equilibria of a game Γ such that bk → b∗.
Then b∗ is also a trembling hand perfect -equilibrium of Γ.
Indeed, for every k, since bk is a trembling hand perfect -equilibrium, there exists a sequence
bk,n of -equilibria of a test sequence Γˆn of Γ, such that bk,n −→
n∞ bk. The sequence bk,k of -
equilibria of the test sequence Γˆk converges to b∗, thus proving that it is a trembling hand perfect
-equilibrium of Γ.
The proof of the lemma is then identical to the proof of Lemma 5, by replacing Claims 2 and
3 with Claims 4 and 5, respectively. 
4.8 Proof of Lemma 1
We have now all the ingredients to prove that, as stated in Lemma 1 every infinite, continuous,
measurable, well-rounded, extensive game with perfect recall and finite action set has a trembling
hand perfect equilibrium. First observe that the set of strategy profiles B of an extensive game Γ
with a finite action set is sequentially compact. Indeed, let Γ be a game with a finite action set A.
For every player i and every information set u, the set of local strategies Biu is a simplex in the
space RA(u), and therefore it is sequentially compact. Because a countable product of sequentially
compact spaces is sequentially compact,
B = ×
i∈N
×
u∈Ui
Biu
is sequentially compact. Indeed, there are countably many finite histories in any game with a finite
action set, therefore there are also countably many information sets.
Consider now a (possibly infinite) continuous well-rounded extensive game Γ with perfect recall
and a finite action set, and consider the corresponding sequence of truncated games Γk. Selten [30]
has shown in 1975 that every finite extensive game with perfect recall has a trembling hand perfect
equilibrium. By this result, every game Γk has a trembling hand perfect equilibrium that we call b
k.
We call b′k the sequence of strategy profiles induced by bk in the game Γ. Because B is sequentially
compact, we can extract a convergent subsequence b′tk and we call b∗ its limit. Lemma 6 shows
that b∗ is a trembling hand perfect equilibrium of Γ.
We say that Γ is a symmetric game if it satisfies the following requirements. (1) For every
player i, there exist a bijection typei : Ui → [1..I] such that for every two players i and i′ and two
information sets u ∈ Ui and u′ ∈ Ui′ such that typei(u) = typei′(u′), we also have A(u) = A(u′)
and actionsi(u) = actionsi′(u
′). (2) For every two players i and i′, we define the relation Ri,i′ on
strategy profiles: For every two strategy profiles b and b′, we have b Ri,i′ b′ if and only if, for every
positive integer k,
bi,type−1i (k)
= b′
i′,type−1
i′ (k)
and b′
i,type−1i (k)
= bi′,type−1
i′ (k)
,
and, for every player j different from i and i′, bj = b′j . To be symmetric, Γ must satisfy that, for
every two players i and i′ and every two strategy profiles b and b′ such that b Ri,i′ b′, we have
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Πi(b) = Πi′(b
′) and Πi(b′) = Πi′(b). In a symmetric game Γ, we say that a profile of strategies
b ∈ B is symmetric if and only if for every two players i and i′, b Ri,i′ b. Since a limit of a sequence
of symmetric strategy profiles is symmetric, we can derive that b∗ is a symmetric trembling-hand
perfect equilibrium. 
5 Existence of efficient robust algorithms for LCL games
The hypotheses regarding the topological nature of the strategy, and on the nature of the payoff
function (continuity, measurability, etc.) are standard in the framework of extensive games. The
notion of well-rounded game is new, and used to capture the fact that the nodes play in rounds
in an LCL game. The fact that the equilibrium is symmetric is crucial since, in LCL games, as in
randomized distributed computing in general, the instructions given to all nodes are identical, and
the behavior of the nodes only vary along with the execution of the algorithm when they progres-
sively discover their environment. We show that LCL games satisfy all hypotheses of Lemma 1,
from which we get our main result as stated in the introduction:
Theorem 1 Let L be a greedily constructible locally checkable labeling. The LCL game associated
to L has a symmetric trembling-hand perfect equilibrium.
The rest of the section is dedicated to the proof of the theorem. We start by formally defining
LCL games.
5.1 Formal Definition of a LCL Game
Let A be a finite alphabet, F a family of graphs with at most n vertices, D a probability distribution
over F , and L a greedily constructible LCL language over F . Let t be the radius of L and good(L)
be the set of good balls in L. Let pref : good(L) 7→ [0,M ], for M > 0, be a function representing
the preferences of the players over good balls and δ ∈ (0, 1) a discounting factor. We define the
game
Γ(L,D, pref, δ) = (N,A,X, P, U, p, pi)
associated to the language L, the distribution D, the preference function pref, and the discounting
factor δ, as follows.
• The player set is N = {1, . . . , n}.
• The action set is A ∪ F where the actions in F are only used by the extra player Chance in
the initial move, and the actions in A are used by the actual players.
• The first move of the game is made by Chance (i.e P (∅) = c). As a result, a graph G ∈ F with
a mapping of the players to the nodes of G is selected at random according to the probability
distribution D. From now on, the players are identified with the vertices of the graph G,
labeled from 1 to n. Note that F might be reduced to a single graph, e.g., F = {Cn}, and
Chance just selects which vertices of the graph will be played by which players.
• The game is then divided into rounds (corresponding to the intuitive meaning in synchronous
distributed algorithms). At each round, the active players play in increasing order, from 1
to n. At round 0 every player is active and plays, and every action in A is available.
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• At the end of each round (i.e., after every active player has played the same number of times),
some players might become inactive, depending on the actions chosen during the previous
rounds. For every i ∈ N , let s(i) denote the last action played by player i, which we call the
state of i, and let ball(i) denote the ball of radius t centered at node i. Every player i such
that ball(i) ∈ good(L) at the end of a round becomes inactive.
• In subsequent rounds, the set of available actions might be restricted. For every round r > 0,
and for every active player i, an action a ∈ A is available to player i if and only if there exists
a ball b ∈ good(L) compatible with the states of inactive players in which s(i) = a.
• A history is terminal if and only if either it is infinite or it comes after the end of a round
and every player is inactive after that round.
• Let x be a history. We denote by actionsi(x) the sequence of actions extracted from x by
selecting all actions taken by player i during rounds before r(x). (The action possibly made
by player i at round r(x), and actions made by a player j 6= i are not included in actionsi(x)).
• Let x and y be two non terminal histories such that P (x) = P (y) = i. Then x and y are in
the same information set if and only if for every j ∈ ball(i), we have
actionsj(x) = actionsj(y).
This can be interpreted by saying that a player i “knows” every action previously taken by
any player at distance at most t.
• Let i be a player, and let z be a terminal history. We define the terminating time timei(z) of
player i in history z by
timei(z) = max{|actionsj(z)|, j ∈ ball(i)} − 1.
The payoff function pi of the game is then defined as follows. For every player i, and every
terminal history z,
pii(z) = δ
timei(z) · pref(ball(i))
And pii(z) = 0 if timei(z) =∞.
5.2 Properties of LCL Games
Fact 5 LCL games are well-rounded.
Proof. This follows directly from the fact that, in a LCL game, every active player plays at every
round until it becomes inactive, and, once inactive, a player cannot become active again. 
Fact 6 LCL games have perfect recall.
Proof. Let Γ(L,D, pref, δ) = (N,A,X, P, U, p, pi) be an LCL game. Let u and u′ be two information
sets of the same player i, for which there exists x ∈ u, x′ ∈ u′ and a ∈ A(u′), such that (x′, a)  x.
Let y be a history in u. Since x and y are in the same information set u, it follows that, for every
player j ∈ ball(i), we have actionsj(x) = actionsj(y). In particular, this implies that x and y are in
24
the same round. Let y′ be the only history which is a prefix of y with P (y′) = i and r(y′) = r(x′).
(Such a history exists because r(x′) < r(x) and r(y) = r(x)). Since the players play in the same
order at every round, we get that, for every player j ∈ ball(i), actionsj(x′) = actionsj(y′). Therefore
y′ ∈ u′. Furthermore, since actionsi(x) = actionsi(y), the action played by i after y′ must be a,
which implies (y′, a)  y, and concludes the proof. 
Fact 7 The payoff function pi of a LCL game is measurable on the σ-algebra Σ corresponding to
the game.
Proof. We prove that, for every player i and every a ∈ R, pi−1i (]a,+∞[) ∈ Σ, which implies that pi
is measurable on Σ. Without loss of generality, let us assume that M = 1, that is, pii : Z 7→ [0, 1].
For every a < 0, we have pi−1i (]a,+∞[) = Z, and thus is in Σ. Similarly, for every a > M , we have
pi−1i (]a,+∞[) = ∅ ∈ Σ. So, let us assume that a ∈]0, 1] and let z be a terminal history such that
pii(z) > a, which implies that timei(z) <
ln a
ln δ , i.e every player in ball(i) has played only a finite
number of times in the history z. Let x be the longest history such that x  z and r(x) = timei(z).
Then the history x′ that comes just after x in z is the shortest prefix of z such that every player in
ball(i) is now inactive. Let z′ be a terminal history such that x′  z′. Since every player j ∈ ball(i)
is inactive after x′, it follows that the state of any such player in z′ is the same as its state in
z. Therefore pii(z
′) = pii(z). It follows from the above that, for any terminal history z such that
pii(z) > a, there exists a finite history x
′ in round timei(z) + 1 such that z ∈ Zx′ ⊆ pi−1i (]a,+∞[).
Since there can only be a finite number of histories in round timei(z), we get that pi
−1
i (]a,+∞[)
is the union of a finite number of sets of the form Zx′ . As a consequence, it is measurable in
Σ. It remains to prove that pi−1i (]0,+∞[) ∈ Σ. actually, this simply follows from the fact that
pi−1i (]0,+∞[) = ∪
k≥1
pi−1i (]
1
k ,+∞[), and the fact that that Σ is stable by countable unions. 
Fact 8 LCL games are continuous.
Proof. Let b be a strategy profile, and let (bk)k≥0 be a sequence of strategy profiles such that
d(bk, b) → 0 when k → ∞. By definition of the metric d on B (cf. subsection 4.4), we have that
d(ρbk , ρb)→ 0 when k →∞. By definition of the metric on O, we have that, for any finite history
x,
|ρbk(x)− ρb(x)| −→
k∞ 0.
It follows that for any set of the form Zx as defined in subsection 4.2,
|µbk(Zx)− µb(Zx)| −→
k∞ 0.
In other words the sequence of measures µbk strongly converges to µb. Since, for every player i, the
function pii is measurable and bounded, it follows that∫
Σ
pii dµbk −→
k∞
∫
Σ
pii dµb.
Therefore, Πi(b
k) −→
k∞ Πi(b), and thus the expected payoff function Π is continuous. 
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5.3 Proof of Theorem 1
The above claims show that every LCL game satisfies the requirements of Lemma 1, and therefore
has a symmetric trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. 
6 Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to address the issue of selfish behaviors in the context of distributed
network computing. Theorem 1 establishes that distributed algorithms coping with selfishness do
exist for a large fraction of locally checkable labeling tasks. This result is the necessary first step
toward designing distributed algorithms in which the players have no incentive to deviate from their
given instructions. One direction for further research consists in looking for efficient (centralized)
algorithms for computing the equilibria, as as well as (distributed) protocols leading the nodes to
automatically adopt the desired behavior, i.e., the one with highest social benefit, either in term
of converging time or quality of the solution, potentially using incentives. Another question for
further studies is to measure the efficiency of trembling-hand Nash equilibria for LCL games in
term of round-complexity. Apart from a few special cases, like, e.g., complete networks, these
issues are challenging problems, but quite rewarding both theoretically and practically. Finally,
from a broader perspective, it would be desirable to characterize efficient distributed algorithms in
terms of a suitable notion of equilibrium in (extensive form) games.
26
References
[1] Noga Alon, La´szlo´ Babai, and Alon Itai. A fast and simple randomized parallel algorithm for
the maximal independent set problem. J. Algorithms, 7(4):567–583, 1986.
[2] David Auger, Johanne Cohen, Pierre Coucheney, and Lise Rodier. Distributed selfish algo-
rithms for the max-cut game. In 28th Int. Symposium on Computer and Information Sciences
(ISCIS), pages 45–54, 2013.
[3] Leonid Barenboim and Michael Elkin. Distributed Graph Coloring: Fundamentals and Recent
Developments. Synthesis Lectures on Distributed Computing Theory. Morgan & Claypool
Publishers, 2013.
[4] Subir K Chakrabarti. Equilibrium in Behavior Strategies in Infinite Extensive Form Games
with Imperfect Information. Economic Theory, 2(4):481–494, 1992.
[5] Yi-Jun Chang, Tsvi Kopelowitz, and Seth Pettie. An exponential separation between ran-
domized and deterministic complexity in the LOCAL model. In 57th IEEE Symposium on.
Foundations of Computer (FOCS), 2016.
[6] Raphael Eidenbenz and Roger Wattenhofer. Good programming in transactional memory:
Game theory meets multicore architecture. Theor. Comput. Sci., 412(32):4136–4150, 2011.
[7] Ky Fan. Fixed-Point and Minimax Theorems in Locally Convex Topological Linear Spaces.
PNAS, 38(2):121–126, 1952.
[8] Laurent Feuilloley and Pierre Fraigniaud. Randomized local network computing. In 27th ACM
Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA), pages 340–349, 2015.
[9] Pierre Fraigniaud, Marc Heinrich, and Adrian Kosowski. Local conflict coloring. In 57th IEEE
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2016.
[10] Pierre Fraigniaud, Amos Korman, and David Peleg. Towards a complexity theory for local
distributed computing. J. ACM, 60(5):35, 2013.
[11] Drew Fudenberg and David Levine. Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon
Games. Journal of Economic Theory, 31(2):251–268, 1983.
[12] Mohsen Ghaffari. An improved distributed algorithm for maximal independent set. In ACM-
SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), 2016.
[13] Irving L. Glicksberg. A Further Generalization of the Kakutani Fixed Point Theorem with
Application to Nash Equilibrium Points. Proceedings of the AMS, 3(1):170–174, 1952.
[14] Christopher Harris. Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect
Information. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 613–628, 1985.
[15] David G. Harris, Johannes Schneider, and Hsin-Hao Su. Distributed (∆ + 1)-coloring in
sublogarithmic rounds. In 48th ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing (STOC), 2016.
27
[16] Fabian Kuhn, Thomas Moscibroda, and Roger Wattenhofer. Radio network clustering from
scratch. In 12th European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA), LNCS 3221, pages 460–471.
Springer, 2004.
[17] Harold W. Kuhn. Extensive Games. In Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of
the United States of America, volume 36, pages 570–576, 1950.
[18] Harold W. Kuhn. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information. In Contributions to the
Theory of Games, volume II (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 28), pages 193–216. Princeton
University Press, 1953.
[19] Michael Luby. A simple parallel algorithm for the maximal independent set problem. SIAM
J. Comput., 15(4):1036–1053, 1986.
[20] Thomas Moscibroda and Roger Wattenhofer. Maximal independent sets in radio networks. In
24th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC), pages 148–157, 2005.
[21] Moni Naor and Larry J. Stockmeyer. What can be computed locally? SIAM J. Comput.,
24(6):1259–1277, 1995.
[22] John F. Nash. Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, 36(1):48–49, 1950.
[23] Noam Nisan. Algorithms for selfish agents. In 16th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of
Computer Science (STACS), pages 1–15, 1999.
[24] Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen. Algorithmic mechanism design. In 31st ACM Symposium on
Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 129–140, 1999.
[25] Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira, Gregory Valiant, and Aviv Zohar. Best-response mechanisms.
In Innovations in Computer Science (ICS), pages 155–165, 2011.
[26] Bezalel Peleg. Equilibrium Points for Games with Infinitely Many Players. Journal of the
London Mathematical Society, 1(1):292–294, 1969.
[27] David Peleg. Distributed Computing: A Locality-Sensitive Approach. SIAM, 2000.
[28] Roy Radner. Collusive Behavior in non-Cooperative epsilon-Equilibria of Oligopolies with
Long but Finite Lives. Journal of Economic Theory, 22:136–154, 1980.
[29] Reinhard Selten. Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfragetraheit.
Z. Gesamte Staatwissenschaft, 12:301–324, 1965.
[30] Reinhard Selten. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Exten-
sive Games. International journal of game theory, 4(1):25–55, 1975.
[31] Jukka Suomela. Survey of local algorithms. ACM Comput. Surv., 45(2):24, 2013.
28
